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Could Product Regulation Result in Less Hazardous
Tobacco Products?
Matthew L. Myers*
In 1964, the first Report of the Surgeon General of the United States
concluded that cigarette smoking caused, or contributed to, many serious
diseases, including lung cancer. Public health efforts to reduce tobacco use
have had substantial success, but today, almost one-quarter of all
Americans smoke and more than four hundred thousand Americans die
yearly from tobacco use. It is clear that current public health efforts must
be expanded. Despite our best efforts, it is also likely that many Americans
will continue to start smoking, while others will be unable or unwilling to
quit. Therefore, it is appropriate to ask what, if anything, can be done to
reduce the harm suffered by those who continue to use tobacco.
There is widespread agreement that cessation and prevention remain
the best methods for reducing the toll of tobacco use. If some smokers
cannot or will not quit, an additional strategy should at least be
considered-one that focuses on whether tobacco products can be
developed that significantly reduce the risk of disease. This seemingly
simple strategy raises concerns that involve complex scientific, behavioral,
ethical, and regulatory questions that fall into three broad categories:
1. What is the impact on the individual? Is it scientifically possible to develop
a tobacco product that will significantly reduce the disease risk of
smoking? Even if it is technically possible to produce less hazardous
products, what must be done to promote the development of such
products while protecting consumers against bogus or unproven health
claims?
2. What is the impact on the public? If reduced-risk products can be
developed, what will be the impact on efforts to discourage initial use
or to encourage cessation? What if introducing a less hazardous
tobacco product leads to a net negative impact on public health by
removing a major motivation to quit smoking or by encouraging
* Matthew L. Myers is President of the Campaign for Tobacco-Free Kids.
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people to start? Is it possible to create a situation-either through
regulation or economic incentives-that maximizes the positive impact
of the introduction of a less hazardous product while minimizing its
negative impact? If not, what should be done?
3. What are the effects on the marketplace? There are two important
considerations. First, what should be done to insure that the greatest
incentives are provided for the development of the least dangerous
substitutes for current tobacco products, including pharmaceutical
products containing nicotine? Second, if it is technically possible to
produce a tobacco product that would be widely used and less
hazardous than products currently on the market, why not require all
tobacco products to meet what would be an ever-improving safety
standard? Rarely has discussion of the potential benefits of reduced-risk
products also included a debate about whether, or under what
circumstances, major technological safety advances should be applied
to all tobacco products. Yet, it makes little sense to encourage the
development of less hazardous products without considering how to
maximize the number of smokers benefiting from them.
These issues are not new. Almost immediately after the release of the
first Report of the Surgeon General, scientists began examining whether
changes in tobacco products themselves could reduce their harm. As early
as 1966, the Public Health Service concluded that "the lower the tar and
nicotine content of cigarette smoke, the less harmful would be the effect."'
The tobacco industry had already discovered that promoting filtered
cigarettes and low-tar cigarettes reassured concerned smokers and was
good for business. As early as the 1950s, major cigarette manufacturers
began widespread advertising of filtered cigarettes, with a variety of explicit
and implicit health claims. Despite a series of cases in the last half of the
1950s in which the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) challenged many of
these health claims, cigarette manufacturers continued to advertise tar
numbers. This advertising practice lasted until 1960, when the FTC issued
guidelines proscribing such implicit health claims absent a standardized
testing method.
With the release of the 1964 Report of the Surgeon General, the
SURGEON GENERAL, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., THE HEALTH CONSEQUENCES OF
SMOKING: THE CHANGING CIGARETTE at v (1981).
2 NAT'L CANCER INST., U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., SMOKING AND TOBACCO
CONTROL MONOGRAPH 7: THE FTC CIGARETTE TESTING METHOD FOR DETERMINING TAR,
NICOTINE, AND CARBON MONOXIDE YIELDS OF U.S. CIGARETTES at iii (1996).
111:1 (2002)
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interest of both the public health community and tobacco manufacturers
in lower-tar cigarettes-potentially less hazardous tobacco products-
increased significantly. After lengthy negotiations between the tobacco
industry and the FTC, in 1967, the FTC approved a machine testing
method that it concluded would provide uniform, standardized data about
the tar and nicotine yield of mainstream cigarette smoke. However, even
the FTC recognized that machine testing did not replicate actual human
smoking.
Three years later, the FTC went one step further. In 1970, it started a
rulemaking procedure to require tobacco companies to include machine-
test ratings in their advertisements. The FTC subsequently dropped its
rulemaking proceedings in favor of voluntary compliance by the major
cigarette manufacturers. The introduction of the FTC testing method had
an immediate effect. The sales-weighted average of tar and nicotine
deliveries of cigarettes dropped dramatically in the following years.
Additionally, the percentage of filter-tipped cigarettes rose and the
percentage of smokers who used cigarettes with tar levels below 15
milligrams skyrocketed.
However, all these changes took place in the absence of any
government regulation of tobacco products or their construction, and with
minimal regulation of marketing. No public authority existed with the
power to require that tobacco manufacturers disclose (1) the methods they
used to alter their products to register lower test scores on the FTC
machine, (2) what they added to their cigarettes, or (3) what they knew
about consumer use of their products. There was no scientific or
regulatory body with the authority to examine actual consumer exposure
to the harmful substances in the newly designed tobacco products, or to
monitor their health impact. Finally, no regulatory agency possessed the
authority to restrain marketing claims that, though accurately reflecting
FTC machine test scores, actually misled the public into thinking these
products had been proven safer.
While the public health community was interested in newly designed
products for their potential health benefit, internal tobacco industry
documents indicate that the tobacco industry sold these products to keep
people smoking.3 To accomplish this goal, the tobacco industry did not
need to make products that were actually safer; it only needed to make
products that would be perceived by the public as safer. According to its
M.E. Johnston, Philip Morris Companies, Inc., Special Report No. 248: Market Potential of
a Health Cigarette 4, at
http://www.pmdocs.com/getallimg.asp?if=avpidx&DOCID=2040452500/2523 (June 1966).
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own documents, that is exactly what it did.4
The results were not surprising. The introduction of the FTC testing
method was a marketing bonanza for cigarette companies but an abysmal
failure for those seeking to reduce the disease risks associated with
smoking. Thirty-four years after the introduction of the FTC testing
method, the National Cancer Institute (NCI) issued a report that was a
devastating indictment of the effort to reduce the disease risks of tobacco
products.5 The NCI reported that while cigarette design changed
dramatically over the last fifty years in response to the FTC testing method,
the disease risks of smoking did not.6 It also noted that many of the design
changes made by tobacco manufacturers reduced tar and nicotine ratings
on the FTC machine but did not alter the actual exposure of consumers to
the harmful constituents of cigarette smoke! As a result, the NCI
concluded:
[T]ar and nicotine measurements made by the FTC method for current
cigarettes have little meaning for the smoker, either for how much he or
she will receive from a given cigarette or for differences in the amount of
tar and nicotine received when he or she smokes different brands of
cigarettes.8
The NCI further concluded that the "[w]idespread adoption of lower
yield cigarettes in the United States has not prevented the sustained
increase in lung cancer among older smokers."9 It added that
"epidemiological and other scientific evidence . . . do[] not indicate a
benefit to public health from changes in cigarette design and
manufacturing over the last fifty years."1 ° The NCI found that many
smokers had switched to lower-yield cigarettes out of concern for their
health, falsely believing the cigarettes to be less risky." Some switched
because they believed that lower-yield cigarettes would be a step towards
quitting. The NCI report showed that those who switched instead of
quitting paid a heavy price.
Recently, the NCI findings were reaffirmed by a report from the World
'Id. at 2.
NAT'L CANCER INST., U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., SMOKING AND TOBACCO
CONTROL MONOGRAPH 13: RISKS ASSOCIATED WITH SMOKING CIGARETTES wiTH Low MACHINE-
MEASURED YIELDS OF TAR AND NICOTINE (200 1).
6 Id. at 1.
'See id. at 1-11.
8 Id. at 1.
'Id. at 10.
10 Id.
1 Id. at 198.
111: 1 (2002)
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Health Organization's Scientific Advisory Committee on Tobacco Product
Regulation. This committee found:
It is now clear that the combination of compensatory changes in smoking
patterns by smokers and cigarette design changes (particularly
ventilation holes in filters) which increased the yield of smoke can
restore the smoke delivery of the so-called low-yield cigarettes to that of
full flavor cigarettes with much higher machine measured yields.
However, as a consequence of the conventional format for conveying tar
and nicotine information, the consumer believes that "low yield"
cigarettes provide an alternative to smoking cessation. This belief persists
even though it is now accepted that "low yield" cigarettes do not offer any
proven health benefit in comparison to higher yield cigarettes.
2
The "tar derby"'' 3 of the last half of the twentieth century was just a
warm-up for the next act by the tobacco industry. Increasing consumer
concern about the health effects of traditional tobacco products,
combined with growing skepticism about low-tar products, has led to an
entirely new generation of tobacco products-often with more specific and
more sophisticated claims implying that these products have been proven
safer. For example, Vector Tobacco, Inc. claims that its product, Omni, is
the "only cigarette to significantly reduce carcinogens that are among the
major causes of lung cancer.' 4 Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corporation
claims its cigarette, Advance, provides "All of the taste . . . Less of the
toxinsTM."'I5 In marketing Advance, Brown & Williamson claims its
TRIONIC filter and patented curing process significantly inhibit the
formation of tobacco-specific nitrosamines.
This is the low-tar derby all over again. In the absence of government
regulation, the manufacturers of this new generation of potentially
reduced-harm products do not have to pre-clear these claims and do not
have to scientifically substantiate claims. They also do not have to disclose
how they make their products, how they allegedly reduce the levels of the
advertised toxic substances, or what they add to these products in the
manufacturing process. Moreover, they do not have to produce any
evidence regarding actual human exposure or any human data that would
12 SCIENTIFIC ADVISORY COMM. ON TOBACCO PROD. REGULATION, WORLD HEALTH ORG.,
CONCLUSIONS ON HEALTH CLAIMS DERIVED FROM ISO / FTC METHOD To MEASURE CIGARETrE
YIELD 1 (2002).
3 NAT'L CANCER INST., supra note 2, at iii.
'4 Vector Tobacco, Inc., http://www.omnicig.com/prodBenefits.asp (last visited Dec. 17,
2002).
5 Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., http://www.bw.com/apps/pdf/advanceonserts.pdf
(last visited Dec. 17, 2002).
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justify their conclusion that their products actually reduce risk by reducing
exposure to one or more toxic substances.
Is there any evidence that this new generation of tobacco products will
actually result in risk reduction? A committee of the Institute of Medicine
(10M) examined this precise question. 6 Its conclusions demonstrate how
little progress we have made in developing a science base to support the
search for verifiably less hazardous tobacco products.
1. There is little direct evidence available to serve as a basis for judgment
as to the potential for harm reduction of specific new tobacco and
pharmaceutical products. 7
2. Although many components of tobacco are known to be toxic, little is
known of the specific dose-response relations of the individual toxins as
they occur in cigarette smoke or of the interactions between the
constituents of tobacco smoke. There is little direct evidence that
removal of specific substances from tobacco smoke or from tobacco
actually reduces risk or harm to human health.'8
3. In considering the health effects of modified tobacco products, it is
important to remember that the health consequences of the use of any
such product are determined not by the toxic agents removed from the
product but by the actual exposure to the toxins that remain. Harm
reduction is the net difference in harm between the products as
actually used.9
4. No one knows the dose-response relations of, the specific toxins in, the
pathogenic mechanisms of, or the interrelationship between the many
components of tobacco smoke with enough precision to make
scientifically reliable quantitative judgments about the risk or actual
harm reduction associated with use of any tobacco product.
20
5. Since even the availability of harm reduction products may deter some
from following the healthier course of abstinence or cessation,
assessment of health claims should be based on an estimate of the
16 COMM. To ASSESS THE Sci. BASE FOR TOBAccO HARM REDUCTION, INST. OF MED., CLEARING
THE SMOKE (Kathleen Stratton et al. eds., 2001).
'7 Id. at ix.
"Id. at viii.
19 Id.
"' Id. at ix.
111: 1 (2002)
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effect of the product on the prevalence of smoking in the population,
as well as the effect on the health risk to the individual smoker."
Based on the reports of the IOM and the NCI, the lesson that should
be learned from our prior experience is that in the absence of effective
government regulation, harm reduction, based on the voluntary action of
tobacco manufacturers, has been a failure. Further, absent government
oversight, harm reduction is virtually certain to continue to fail for at least
two reasons. First, the interest of tobacco manufacturers in selling their
products is served by products that are perceived to be safe, even if they are
not. Second, the public health community, on its own, lacks the resources
to develop the science needed to assess which products offer the greatest
potential for risk reduction, the ability to monitor product changes or the
health impact of these products, and the authority to restrain how these
products are marketed.
Nonetheless, neither the most recent report from the NCI nor the
report from the IOM contradicts the original belief that a reduction in
actual exposure to the harmful components of tobacco products will
reduce risk. On the contrary, both agree that it is still reasonable to expect
a relationship between the magnitude of exposure and the incidence of
disease. Specifically, the IOM concludes that "[f]or many diseases
attributable to tobacco use, reducing risk of disease by reducing exposure
to tobacco toxicants is feasible."22
For nearly forty years, scientists have believed it feasible to reduce the
death toll from tobacco use by altering tobacco products. However, we
have made little progress in accomplishing that goal and in developing the
scientific and regulatory tools to do so. Harm reduction, as a public health
strategy, is worth pursuing only if it is preceded by the adoption of a
meaningful regulatory system under the United States Food and Drug
Administration (FDA). The IOM agrees with the need for regulation,
concluding that the regulation of all tobacco products, both conventional
and potentially reduced-risk products, is necessary to assure a scientific
basis for judging the effects of these products and to assure that the health
of the public is protected.23
Indeed, the success of a proposed harm reduction strategy depends
upon adequate FDA authority to oversee its development. The FDA's
authority must include the following:
21 id.
22 Id. at 5.
23 Id. at 6.
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1. Tobacco companies must be required to disclose how they make their
products and what they put into them. They must be required to test,
and disclose to the FDA, substances in mainstream and side-stream
smoke and the quantities in which they are received and metabolized.
They must also be required to disclose all internal research relevant to
health considerations.
2. When tobacco companies make any change in the design or
composition of a tobacco product, they must be required to disclose
that information to the FDA as well as any additional information
required to evaluate the potential impact of the change.
3. The FDA must have the authority to set performance standards for all
tobacco products for the purpose of reducing the harms they cause.
This should include authority to require the reduction or removal of a
component of the product, or its smoke, that the agency has identified
as a harmful or potentially harmful substance, when technology exists
to do so. The FDA's authority to require the removal of such a
substance should be based on the conclusion that its removal is best for
public health, considering the impact on both the individual smoker
and the public as a whole. However, once a substance has been
identified as potentially harmful, the FDA should not bear the burden
of proof that the substance's removal will reduce disease risk.
4. The FDA must have broad authority to set standards for the promotion
of less hazardous tobacco products, recognizing that its overall goal
must be to reduce harm to both individual smokers and the population
at large. The FDA's consideration of whether a product may be
promoted as less hazardous must be based on the best available
scientific assessment of actual risk and not just exposure, except where
there is a scientific basis for correlating specific exposure with risk. The
FDA's assessment of the product is just the starting point. The
assessment must also examine actual exposure based on how the
product will be used, who will use the product, and why. It should also
consider the product's likely impact on smoking cessation and
initiation. Therefore, the FDA's authority must extend to the
marketing of these products and post-market surveillance, enabling the
FDA to periodically reevaluate the actual impact of a product.
5. The FDA must have resources to develop the science base to effectively
111:1 (2002)
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evaluate different tobacco products and assess the behavioral impact of
different marketing tools and claims. Harm reduction, as a strategy
involving tobacco products, should not take place in isolation from
either the FDA's consideration of the potential role of non-tobacco
pharmaceutical products for smokers who cannot or choose not to
quit, or its authority to set standards for all tobacco products. At
present, pharmaceutical products containing nicotine have been
approved for use exclusively as cessation tools. The potential for these
products as long-term substitutes for tobacco users who cannot or will
not quit has not been explored, despite the fact that these products
have already met rigorous safety standards for short-term use. Similarly,
if a harm reduction strategy leads to the introduction of less hazardous
tobacco products that become widely used by consumers, the FDA
should have the authority to require that all tobacco products meet its
safety standards.
Until now, the debate about whether or not tobacco products can be
made less hazardous and whether or not harm reduction is a legitimate
public health strategy has taken place in an unregulated environment. If
the goal is saving lives, harm reduction in the absence of regulation should
be rejected as a public health strategy. Science continues to suggest that it
is possible both to reduce the harm of tobacco products and to use harm
reduction to reduce the death toll from tobacco use-if and only if the
FDA is given broad, meaningful authority over both conventional and new
tobacco products.
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